6094
INFORMATIONAL
Summary of Cryptographic Authentication Algorithm Implementation Requirements for Routing Protocols
Authors: M. Bhatia, V. Manral
Date: February 2011
Area: ops
Working Group: opsec
Stream: IETF
Abstract
The routing protocols Open Shortest Path First version 2 (OSPFv2), Intermediate System to Intermediate System (IS-IS), and Routing Information Protocol (RIP) currently define cleartext and MD5 (Message Digest 5) methods for authenticating protocol packets. Recently, effort has been made to add support for the SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm) family of hash functions for the purpose of authenticating routing protocol packets for RIP, IS-IS, and OSPF.
To encourage interoperability between disparate implementations, it is imperative that we specify the expected minimal set of algorithms, thereby ensuring that there is at least one algorithm that all implementations will have in common.
Similarly, RIP for IPv6 (RIPng) and OSPFv3 support IPsec algorithms for authenticating their protocol packets.
This document examines the current set of available algorithms, with interoperability and effective cryptographic authentication protection being the principal considerations. Cryptographic authentication of these routing protocols requires the availability of the same algorithms in disparate implementations. It is desirable that newly specified algorithms should be implemented and available in routing protocol implementations because they may be promoted to requirements at some future time. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.
RFC 6094
INFORMATIONAL
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M. Bhatia
Request for Comments: 6094 Alcatel-Lucent
Category: Informational V. Manral
ISSN: 2070-1721 IP Infusion
February 2011
<span class="h1">Summary of Cryptographic Authentication Algorithm Implementation</span>
<span class="h1">Requirements for Routing Protocols</span>
Abstract
The routing protocols Open Shortest Path First version 2 (OSPFv2),
Intermediate System to Intermediate System (IS-IS), and Routing
Information Protocol (RIP) currently define cleartext and MD5
(Message Digest 5) methods for authenticating protocol packets.
Recently, effort has been made to add support for the SHA (Secure
Hash Algorithm) family of hash functions for the purpose of
authenticating routing protocol packets for RIP, IS-IS, and OSPF.
To encourage interoperability between disparate implementations, it
is imperative that we specify the expected minimal set of algorithms,
thereby ensuring that there is at least one algorithm that all
implementations will have in common.
Similarly, RIP for IPv6 (RIPng) and OSPFv3 support IPsec algorithms
for authenticating their protocol packets.
This document examines the current set of available algorithms, with
interoperability and effective cryptographic authentication
protection being the principal considerations. Cryptographic
authentication of these routing protocols requires the availability
of the same algorithms in disparate implementations. It is desirable
that newly specified algorithms should be implemented and available
in routing protocol implementations because they may be promoted to
requirements at some future time.
Status of This Memo
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
published for informational purposes.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents
approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
Standard; see <a href="./rfc5741#section-2">Section 2 of RFC 5741</a>.
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Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6094">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6094</a>.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
<a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction ....................................................<a href="#page-3">3</a>
<a href="#section-2">2</a>. Intermediate System to Intermediate System (IS-IS) ..............<a href="#page-4">4</a>
<a href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. Authentication Scheme Selection ............................<a href="#page-4">4</a>
<a href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. Authentication Algorithm Selection .........................<a href="#page-5">5</a>
<a href="#section-3">3</a>. Open Shortest Path First Version 2 (OSPFv2) .....................<a href="#page-5">5</a>
<a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Authentication Scheme Selection ............................<a href="#page-6">6</a>
<a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Authentication Algorithm Selection .........................<a href="#page-6">6</a>
<a href="#section-4">4</a>. Open Shortest Path First Version 3 (OSPFv3) .....................<a href="#page-7">7</a>
<a href="#section-5">5</a>. Routing Information Protocol Version 2 (RIPv2) ..................<a href="#page-7">7</a>
<a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Authentication Scheme Selection ............................<a href="#page-7">7</a>
<a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Authentication Algorithm Selection .........................<a href="#page-8">8</a>
<a href="#section-6">6</a>. Routing Information Protocol for IPv6 (RIPng) ...................<a href="#page-8">8</a>
<a href="#section-7">7</a>. Security Considerations .........................................<a href="#page-9">9</a>
<a href="#section-8">8</a>. Acknowledgements ................................................<a href="#page-9">9</a>
<a href="#section-9">9</a>. References .....................................................<a href="#page-10">10</a>
<a href="#section-9.1">9.1</a>. Normative References ......................................<a href="#page-10">10</a>
<a href="#section-9.2">9.2</a>. Informative References ....................................<a href="#page-10">10</a>
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span>
Most routing protocols include three different types of
authentication schemes: Null authentication, cleartext password, and
cryptographic authentication. Null authentication is equivalent to
having no authentication scheme at all.
In a cleartext scheme, also known as a "simple password" scheme, the
password is exchanged completely unprotected, and anyone with
physical access to the network can learn the password and compromise
the integrity of the routing domain. The simple password scheme
protects against accidental establishment of routing sessions in a
given domain, but beyond that it offers no additional protection.
In a cryptographic authentication scheme, routers share a secret key
that is used to generate a message authentication code for each of
the protocol packets. Today, routing protocols that implement
message authentication codes often use a Keyed-MD5 [<a href="./rfc1321" title=""The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm"">RFC1321</a>] digest.
The recent escalating series of attacks on MD5 raise concerns about
its remaining useful lifetime.
These attacks may not necessarily result in direct vulnerabilities
for Keyed-MD5 digests as message authentication codes because the
colliding message may not correspond to a syntactically correct
protocol packet. The known collision, pre-image, and second
pre-image attacks [<a href="./rfc4270" title=""Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes in Internet Protocols"">RFC4270</a>] on MD5 may not increase the effectiveness
of the key recovery attacks on HMAC-MD5. Regardless, there is a need
felt to deprecate MD5 [<a href="./rfc1321" title=""The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm"">RFC1321</a>] as the basis for the Hashed Message
Authentication Code (HMAC) algorithm in favor of stronger digest
algorithms.
In light of these considerations, there are proposals to replace
HMAC-MD5 with keyed HMAC-SHA [<a href="#ref-SHS" title=""Secure Hash Standard (SHS)"">SHS</a>] digests where HMAC-MD5 is
currently mandated in RIPv2 [<a href="./rfc2453" title=""RIP Version 2"">RFC2453</a>] IS-IS [<a href="#ref-ISO" title=""Intermediate system to Intermediate system routing information exchange protocol for use in conjunction with the protocol for providing the connectionless-mode network service"">ISO</a>] [<a href="./rfc1195" title=""Use of OSI IS-IS for routing in TCP/IP and dual environments"">RFC1195</a>], and
Keyed-MD5 in OSPFv2 [<a href="./rfc2328" title=""OSPF Version 2"">RFC2328</a>].
OSPFv3 [<a href="./rfc5340" title=""OSPF for IPv6"">RFC5340</a>] and RIPng [<a href="./rfc2080" title=""RIPng for IPv6"">RFC2080</a>] rely on the IPv6 Authentication
Header (AH) [<a href="./rfc4302" title=""IP Authentication Header"">RFC4302</a>] and IPv6 Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
[<a href="./rfc4303" title=""IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)"">RFC4303</a>] in order to provide integrity, authentication, and/or
confidentiality.
However, the nature of cryptography is that algorithmic improvement
is an ongoing process, as is the exploration and refinement of attack
vectors. An algorithm believed to be strong today may be
demonstrated to be weak tomorrow. Given this, the choice of
preferred algorithm should favor the minimization of the likelihood
of it being compromised quickly.
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It should be recognized that preferred algorithm(s) will change over
time to adapt to the evolving threats. At any particular time, the
mandatory-to-implement algorithm(s) might not be specified in the
base protocol specification. As protocols are extended, the
preference for presently stronger algorithms presents a problem
regarding the question of interoperability of existing and future
implementations with respect to standards, and also regarding
operational preference for the configuration as deployed.
It is expected that an implementation should support the changing of
security (authentication) keys. Changing the symmetric key used in
any HMAC algorithm on a periodic basis is good security practice.
Operators need to plan for this.
Implementations can support in-service key change so that no control
packets are lost. During an in-service/in-band key change, more than
one key can be active for receiving packets for a session. Some
protocols support a key identifier that allows the two peers of a
session to have multiple keys simultaneously for a session.
However, these protocols currently manage keys manually (i.e., via
operator intervention) or dynamically based on some timer or security
protocol.
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Intermediate System to Intermediate System (IS-IS)</span>
The IS-IS specification allows for authentication of its Protocol
Data Units (PDUs) via the authentication TLV (TLV 10) in the PDU.
The base specification [<a href="#ref-ISO" title=""Intermediate system to Intermediate system routing information exchange protocol for use in conjunction with the protocol for providing the connectionless-mode network service"">ISO</a>] had provisions only for cleartext
passwords. [<a href="./rfc5304" title=""IS-IS Cryptographic Authentication"">RFC5304</a>] extends the authentication capabilities by
providing cryptographic authentication for IS-IS PDUs. It mandates
support for HMAC-MD5.
[<a id="ref-RFC5310">RFC5310</a>] adds support for the use of any cryptographic hash function
for authenticating IS-IS PDUs. In addition to this, [<a href="./rfc5310" title=""IS-IS Generic Cryptographic Authentication"">RFC5310</a>] also
details how IS-IS can use the HMAC construct along with the Secure
Hash Algorithm (SHA) family of cryptographic hash functions to secure
IS-IS PDUs.
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. Authentication Scheme Selection</span>
In order for IS-IS implementations to securely interoperate, they
must support one or more authentication schemes in common. This
section specifies the preference for standards-conformant IS-IS
implementations that use accepted authentication schemes.
The earliest interoperability requirement for authentication as
stated by [<a href="#ref-ISO" title=""Intermediate system to Intermediate system routing information exchange protocol for use in conjunction with the protocol for providing the connectionless-mode network service"">ISO</a>] [<a href="./rfc1195" title=""Use of OSI IS-IS for routing in TCP/IP and dual environments"">RFC1195</a>] required all implementations to support a
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cleartext password. This authentication scheme's utility is limited
to precluding the accidental introduction of a new IS into a
broadcast domain. Operators should not use this scheme, as it
provides no protection against an attacker with access to the
broadcast domain: anyone can determine the secret password through
inspection of the PDU. This mechanism does not provide any
significant level of security and should be avoided.
[<a id="ref-RFC5304">RFC5304</a>] defined the cryptographic authentication scheme for IS-IS.
HMAC-MD5 was the only algorithm specified; hence, it is mandated.
[<a href="./rfc5310" title=""IS-IS Generic Cryptographic Authentication"">RFC5310</a>] defined a generic cryptographic scheme and added support
for additional algorithms. Implementations should support [<a href="./rfc5310" title=""IS-IS Generic Cryptographic Authentication"">RFC5310</a>],
as it defines the generic cryptographic authentication scheme.
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2" href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. Authentication Algorithm Selection</span>
For IS-IS implementations to securely interoperate, they must have
support for one or more authentication algorithms in common.
This section details the authentication algorithm requirements for
standards-conformant IS-IS implementations.
The following are the available options for authentication
algorithms:
o [<a href="./rfc5304" title=""IS-IS Cryptographic Authentication"">RFC5304</a>] mandates the use of HMAC-MD5.
o [<a href="./rfc5310" title=""IS-IS Generic Cryptographic Authentication"">RFC5310</a>] does not require a particular algorithm but instead
supports any digest algorithm (i.e., cryptographic hash
functions).
As noted earlier, there is a desire to deprecate MD5. IS-IS
implementations will likely migrate to an authentication scheme
supported by [<a href="./rfc5310" title=""IS-IS Generic Cryptographic Authentication"">RFC5310</a>], because it is algorithm agnostic. Possible
digest algorithms include SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and
SHA-512. Picking at least one mandatory-to-implement algorithm is
imperative to ensuring interoperability.
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Open Shortest Path First Version 2 (OSPFv2)</span>
[<a id="ref-RFC2328">RFC2328</a>] includes three different types of authentication schemes:
Null authentication, cleartext password (defined as "simple password"
in [<a href="./rfc2328" title=""OSPF Version 2"">RFC2328</a>]), and cryptographic authentication. Null authentication
is semantically equivalent to no authentication.
In the cryptographic authentication scheme, the OSPFv2 routers on a
common network/subnet are configured with a shared secret that is
used to generate a Keyed-MD5 digest for each packet. A monotonically
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increasing sequence number scheme is used to protect against replay
attacks.
[<a id="ref-RFC5709">RFC5709</a>] adds support for the use of the SHA family of hash
algorithms for authentication of OSPFv2 packets.
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Authentication Scheme Selection</span>
For OSPF implementations to securely interoperate, they must have one
or more authentication schemes in common.
While all implementations will have Null authentication since it's
mandated by [<a href="./rfc2328" title=""OSPF Version 2"">RFC2328</a>], its use is not appropriate in any context
where the operator wishes to authenticate OSPFv2 packets in their
network.
While all implementations will also support a cleartext password
since it's mandated by [<a href="./rfc2328" title=""OSPF Version 2"">RFC2328</a>], its use is only appropriate when
the operator wants to preclude the accidental introduction of a
router into the domain. This scheme is patently not useful when an
operator wants to authenticate the OSPFv2 packets.
Cryptographic authentication is a mandatory scheme defined in
[<a href="./rfc2328" title=""OSPF Version 2"">RFC2328</a>], and all conformant implementations must support this.
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Authentication Algorithm Selection</span>
For OSPFv2 implementations to securely interoperate, they must
support one or more cryptographic authentication algorithms in
common.
The following are the available options for authentication
algorithms:
o [<a href="./rfc2328" title=""OSPF Version 2"">RFC2328</a>] specifies the use of Keyed-MD5.
o [<a href="./rfc5709" title=""OSPFv2 HMAC-SHA Cryptographic Authentication"">RFC5709</a>] specifies the use of HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256,
HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512, and also mandates support for
HMAC-SHA-256 (HMAC-SHA-1 is optional).
As noted earlier, there is a desire to deprecate MD5. Some
alternatives for MD5 are listed in [<a href="./rfc5709" title=""OSPFv2 HMAC-SHA Cryptographic Authentication"">RFC5709</a>].
Possible digest algorithms include SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and
SHA-512. Picking one mandatory-to-implement algorithm is imperative
to ensuring interoperability.
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Open Shortest Path First Version 3 (OSPFv3)</span>
OSPFv3 [<a href="./rfc5340" title=""OSPF for IPv6"">RFC5340</a>] relies on the IPv6 Authentication Header (AH)
[<a href="./rfc4302" title=""IP Authentication Header"">RFC4302</a>] and IPv6 Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [<a href="./rfc4303" title=""IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)"">RFC4303</a>] in
order to provide integrity, authentication, and/or confidentiality.
[<a id="ref-RFC4552">RFC4552</a>] mandates the use of ESP for authenticating OSPFv3 packets.
The implementations could also provide support for using AH to
protect these packets.
The algorithm requirements for AH and ESP are described in [<a href="./rfc4835" title=""Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Requirements for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH)"">RFC4835</a>]
as follows:
o [<a href="./rfc2404" title=""The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH"">RFC2404</a>] mandates HMAC-SHA-1-96.
o [<a href="./rfc3566" title=""The AES-XCBC-MAC-96 Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec"">RFC3566</a>] indicates AES-XCBC-MAC-96 as a "should", but it's likely
that this will be mandated at some future time.
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Routing Information Protocol Version 2 (RIPv2)</span>
RIPv2, originally specified in [<a href="./rfc1388" title=""RIP Version 2 Carrying Additional Information"">RFC1388</a>] and then in [<a href="./rfc1723" title=""RIP Version 2 - Carrying Additional Information"">RFC1723</a>], has
been updated and published as STD 56, [<a href="./rfc2453" title=""RIP Version 2"">RFC2453</a>]. If the Address
Family Identifier of the first (and only the first) entry in the
RIPv2 message is 0xFFFF, then the remainder of the entry contains the
authentication information. The [<a href="./rfc2453" title=""RIP Version 2"">RFC2453</a>] version of the protocol
provides for authenticating packets using a cleartext password
(defined as "simple password" in [<a href="./rfc2453" title=""RIP Version 2"">RFC2453</a>]) not more than 16 octets
in length.
[<a id="ref-RFC2082">RFC2082</a>] added support for Keyed-MD5 authentication, where a digest
is appended to the end of the RIP packet. [<a href="./rfc4822" title=""RIPv2 Cryptographic Authentication"">RFC4822</a>] obsoleted
[<a href="./rfc2082" title=""RIP-2 MD5 Authentication"">RFC2082</a>] and added the SHA family of hash algorithms to the list of
cryptographic authentications that can be used to protect RIPv2,
whereas [<a href="./rfc2082" title=""RIP-2 MD5 Authentication"">RFC2082</a>] previously specified only the use of Keyed-MD5.
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1" href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Authentication Scheme Selection</span>
For RIPv2 implementations to securely interoperate, they must support
one or more authentication schemes in common.
While all implementations will support a cleartext password since
it's mandated by [<a href="./rfc2453" title=""RIP Version 2"">RFC2453</a>], its use is only appropriate when the
operator wants to preclude the accidental introduction of a router
into the domain. This scheme is patently not useful when an operator
wants to authenticate the RIPv2 packets.
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[<a id="ref-RFC2082">RFC2082</a>] mandates the use of an authentication scheme that uses
Keyed-MD5. However, [<a href="./rfc2082" title=""RIP-2 MD5 Authentication"">RFC2082</a>] has been obsoleted by [<a href="./rfc4822" title=""RIPv2 Cryptographic Authentication"">RFC4822</a>].
Compliant implementations must provide support for an authentication
scheme that uses Keyed-MD5 but should recognize that this is
superseded by cryptographic authentication as defined in [<a href="./rfc4822" title=""RIPv2 Cryptographic Authentication"">RFC4822</a>].
Implementations should provide support for [<a href="./rfc4822" title=""RIPv2 Cryptographic Authentication"">RFC4822</a>], as it specifies
the RIPv2 cryptographic authentication schemes.
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2" href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Authentication Algorithm Selection</span>
For RIPv2 implementations to securely interoperate, they must support
one or more authentication algorithms in common.
The following are the available options for authentication
algorithms:
o [<a href="./rfc2082" title=""RIP-2 MD5 Authentication"">RFC2082</a>] specifies the use of Keyed-MD5.
o [<a href="./rfc4822" title=""RIPv2 Cryptographic Authentication"">RFC4822</a>] specifies the use of Keyed-MD5, HMAC-SHA-1,
HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512.
As noted earlier, there is a desire to deprecate MD5. Some
alternatives for MD5 are listed in [<a href="./rfc4822" title=""RIPv2 Cryptographic Authentication"">RFC4822</a>]. Possible digest
algorithms include SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. Picking one
mandatory-to-implement algorithm is imperative to ensuring
interoperability.
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Routing Information Protocol for IPv6 (RIPng)</span>
RIPng [<a href="./rfc2080" title=""RIPng for IPv6"">RFC2080</a>] relies on the IPv6 Authentication Header (AH)
[<a href="./rfc4302" title=""IP Authentication Header"">RFC4302</a>] and IPv6 Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [<a href="./rfc4303" title=""IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)"">RFC4303</a>] in
order to provide integrity, authentication, and/or confidentiality.
The algorithm requirements for AH and ESP are described in [<a href="./rfc4835" title=""Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Requirements for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH)"">RFC4835</a>]
as follows:
o [<a href="./rfc2404" title=""The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH"">RFC2404</a>] mandates HMAC-SHA-1-96.
o [<a href="./rfc3566" title=""The AES-XCBC-MAC-96 Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec"">RFC3566</a>] indicates AES-XCBC-MAC-96 as a "should", but it's likely
that this will be mandated at some future time.
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Security Considerations</span>
The cryptographic mechanisms referenced in this document provide only
authentication algorithms. These algorithms do not provide
confidentiality. Encrypting the content of the packet and thereby
providing confidentiality is not considered in the definition of the
routing protocols.
The cryptographic strength of the HMAC depends upon the cryptographic
strength of the underlying hash function and on the size and quality
of the key. The feasibility of attacking the integrity of routing
protocol messages protected by keyed digests may be significantly
more limited than that of other data; however, preference for one
family of algorithms over another may also change independently of
the perceived risk to a particular protocol.
To ensure greater security, the keys used should be changed
periodically, and implementations must be able to store and use more
than one key at the same time. Operational experience suggests that
the lack of periodic rekeying is a source of significant exposure and
that the lifespan of shared keys in the network is frequently
measured in years.
While simple password schemes are well represented in the document
series and in conformant implementations of the protocols, the
inability to offer either integrity or identity protection are
sufficient reason to strongly discourage their use.
This document concerns itself with the selection of cryptographic
algorithms for use in the authentication of routing protocol packets
being exchanged between adjacent routing processes. The
cryptographic algorithms identified in this document are not known to
be broken at the current time, and ongoing cryptographic research so
far leads us to believe that they will likely remain secure in the
foreseeable future. We expect that new revisions of this document
will be issued in the future to reflect current thinking on the
algorithms that various routing protocols should employ to ensure
interoperability between disparate implementations.
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Acknowledgements</span>
We would like to thank Joel Jaeggli, Sean Turner, and Adrian Farrel
for their comments and feedback on this document, which resulted in
significant improvement of the same.
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. References</span>
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.1" href="#section-9.1">9.1</a>. Normative References</span>
[<a id="ref-ISO">ISO</a>] "Intermediate system to Intermediate system routing
information exchange protocol for use in conjunction with
the protocol for providing the connectionless-mode
network service", ISO/IEC 10589:1992 (ISO 8473).
[<a id="ref-RFC1195">RFC1195</a>] Callon, R., "Use of OSI IS-IS for routing in TCP/IP and
dual environments", <a href="./rfc1195">RFC 1195</a>, December 1990.
[<a id="ref-RFC2080">RFC2080</a>] Malkin, G. and R. Minnear, "RIPng for IPv6", <a href="./rfc2080">RFC 2080</a>,
January 1997.
[<a id="ref-RFC2328">RFC2328</a>] Moy, J., "OSPF Version 2", STD 54, <a href="./rfc2328">RFC 2328</a>, April 1998.
[<a id="ref-RFC2453">RFC2453</a>] Malkin, G., "RIP Version 2", STD 56, <a href="./rfc2453">RFC 2453</a>,
November 1998.
[<a id="ref-RFC4822">RFC4822</a>] Atkinson, R. and M. Fanto, "RIPv2 Cryptographic
Authentication", <a href="./rfc4822">RFC 4822</a>, February 2007.
[<a id="ref-RFC4835">RFC4835</a>] Manral, V., "Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation
Requirements for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and
Authentication Header (AH)", <a href="./rfc4835">RFC 4835</a>, April 2007.
[<a id="ref-RFC5304">RFC5304</a>] Li, T. and R. Atkinson, "IS-IS Cryptographic
Authentication", <a href="./rfc5304">RFC 5304</a>, October 2008.
[<a id="ref-RFC5310">RFC5310</a>] Bhatia, M., Manral, V., Li, T., Atkinson, R., White, R.,
and M. Fanto, "IS-IS Generic Cryptographic
Authentication", <a href="./rfc5310">RFC 5310</a>, February 2009.
[<a id="ref-RFC5340">RFC5340</a>] Coltun, R., Ferguson, D., Moy, J., and A. Lindem, "OSPF
for IPv6", <a href="./rfc5340">RFC 5340</a>, July 2008.
[<a id="ref-RFC5709">RFC5709</a>] Bhatia, M., Manral, V., Fanto, M., White, R., Barnes, M.,
Li, T., and R. Atkinson, "OSPFv2 HMAC-SHA Cryptographic
Authentication", <a href="./rfc5709">RFC 5709</a>, October 2009.
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.2" href="#section-9.2">9.2</a>. Informative References</span>
[<a id="ref-RFC1321">RFC1321</a>] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", <a href="./rfc1321">RFC 1321</a>,
April 1992.
[<a id="ref-RFC1388">RFC1388</a>] Malkin, G., "RIP Version 2 Carrying Additional
Information", <a href="./rfc1388">RFC 1388</a>, January 1993.
<span class="grey">Bhatia & Manral Informational [Page 10]</span><span id="page-11" ></span>
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6094">RFC 6094</a> Crypto Reqs for Routing Protocols February 2011</span>
[<a id="ref-RFC1723">RFC1723</a>] Malkin, G., "RIP Version 2 - Carrying Additional
Information", <a href="./rfc1723">RFC 1723</a>, November 1994.
[<a id="ref-RFC2082">RFC2082</a>] Baker, F. and R. Atkinson, "RIP-2 MD5 Authentication",
<a href="./rfc2082">RFC 2082</a>, January 1997.
[<a id="ref-RFC2404">RFC2404</a>] Madson, C. and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within
ESP and AH", <a href="./rfc2404">RFC 2404</a>, November 1998.
[<a id="ref-RFC3566">RFC3566</a>] Frankel, S. and H. Herbert, "The AES-XCBC-MAC-96
Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec", <a href="./rfc3566">RFC 3566</a>,
September 2003.
[<a id="ref-RFC4270">RFC4270</a>] Hoffman, P. and B. Schneier, "Attacks on Cryptographic
Hashes in Internet Protocols", <a href="./rfc4270">RFC 4270</a>, November 2005.
[<a id="ref-RFC4302">RFC4302</a>] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", <a href="./rfc4302">RFC 4302</a>,
December 2005.
[<a id="ref-RFC4303">RFC4303</a>] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
<a href="./rfc4303">RFC 4303</a>, December 2005.
[<a id="ref-RFC4552">RFC4552</a>] Gupta, M. and N. Melam, "Authentication/Confidentiality
for OSPFv3", <a href="./rfc4552">RFC 4552</a>, June 2006.
[<a id="ref-SHS">SHS</a>] "Secure Hash Standard (SHS)", National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) FIPS Publication 180-3,
October 2008.
Authors' Addresses
Manav Bhatia
Alcatel-Lucent
Bangalore
India
EMail: [email protected]
Vishwas Manral
IP Infusion
1188 E. Arques Ave.
Sunnyvale, CA 94089
USA
Phone: 408-400-1900
EMail: [email protected]
Bhatia & Manral Informational [Page 11]
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